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The Pacific region is part of a larger world, far from being as isolated from 
centres of global power as a glance at the map might imply, but instead 
caught up in a web of multilateral relations with binding effects on its future 
progress and prosperity. This article considers such connections, in regard 
to both governmental and non-government agencies, referring in particular 
to the proliferation of highly influential non-governmental organisations in 
the region, as in the world at large. It treats the European Union  handling 
of the December 2006 Fijian coup d’état and its aftermath as a case study 
in government-to-government relations, and it provides secondly a detailed 
case study on the operations of one outstanding example of a non-govern-
mental organisation, the International Crisis Group.
LEE DUFFIELD
Queensland University of Technology
ON the weekend of 14-15 April 2007, three ministers from the mili-tary-backed ‘interim’ government of Fiji travelled to Brussels to face questions and seek to obtain guarantees of continued, vital financial 
assistance for the nation’s economy. The incident might have been seen as a 
case of colonial obeisance had it not been for the clearly contractual charac-
ter of the European Union’s Cotonou Agreement, under which development 
assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is tied to observance 
of agreed standards on human rights, governance and suppression of official 
corruption. It also made a point that the Pacific region is part of a larger 
world, far from being as isolated from centres of global power as a glance at 
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the map might imply, but instead caught up in a web of multilateral relations 
with binding effects on its future progress and prosperity.
This article considers such connections, in regard to both governmental 
and non-government agencies, referring in particular to the proliferation of 
highly influential non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the region, as in 
the world at large. It treats the European Union (EU) handling of the December 
2006 Fijian coup d’état and its aftermath as a case study in government-to-
government relations, and it provides secondly a detailed case study on the 
operations of one outstanding example of a non-governmental organisation, 
the International Crisis Group (called ‘Crisis Group’).
It is reiterated in the article that most often government and non-govern-
ment bodies in the field of economic and civic development are cosmopolitan 
and function on an international plane; they overlap in their structures and 
functions, collaborate and combine; ultimately agree on similar policy goals, 
and so work together as a common movement.        
Government	agencies:	The	European	Union
In relations between Fiji and Europe this year, the EU position emphasised 
patient dialogue, and after talks it agreed to continued release of money for 
development purposes, as the Fijian authorities had undertaken to lift their 
Public Emergency Regulations in May 2007 and schedule free elections 
before 1 March 2009 (EC Pacific, 19 April 2007, 22 June 2007). This 
review of the process of consultation adopts the method of tracing the public 
record in media reportage and published announcements by the parties. It 
was enabled especially by the policy of openness insisted on by the EU in its 
standard operating procedures.    
The gravity of the situation had been made apparent, in fact heavily pub-
licised through the EU’s insistence on transparency, providing an ‘open book’ 
on the fact of negotiations, the issues and demands, and amounts of money 
brought into the discussion. The initial fact of the ministerial mission to Europe 
in April was not kept secret in Suva, and once picked up by the Fiji Times (15 
April 2007) the essential information from then on was given out as the process 
unfolded by the European Commission through its office in Suva.      
The 27 member countries of the EU have enormous economic impacts 
as together the world’s largest provider of development assistance, to 150 
countries; in 2006 European aid to Pacific countries increased by 9.5 percent 
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to EU 2.93 billion (US$3.99 billion) (EUAustralia, 21 March 2007). At the 
April consultations the EU would announce that a total of F$400 million 
($US245.4 million) in multilateral assistance was ‘at stake or delayed’ as a 
result of the December coup. (It included F$44 million—US$26.9 million—for 
European Development Fund programmes for school rebuilding, civic and 
voter education, and a solid waste environmental scheme; and F$274-US$168 
million--for sugar industry restructuring, mostly unallocated at the time). It 
said: ‘The European Union considers that the military take-over … constitutes 
a breach of the essential elements of Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement … 
The EU encourages Fiji to examine the roots of the “coup culture” and the 
means to eradicate it’ (EC Pacific, 18, 19 April 2007).
Koos Richelle, Director General of the EU’s Europeaid Cooperation 
Office, had pointed out (EUAustralia, 21 March 2007) the importance of the 
organisation’s Suva office as the centre of the only regional system where all 
national programmes were integrated into a single regional strategy—focusing 
on environment and sustainable development. He said the involvement could 
be intimate, with offices also in Auckland, Port Moresby and Sydney (and a 
representation in Solomon Islands): ‘We get good political reports when there 
are problems as in Fiji …’
It is a key fact of the situation of any region in a ‘globalised’ world order 
that organised outside agencies will be involved in political and economic 
affairs, and in the process will stake out positions of their own. It raises of 
course the demand that all implications of such engagements must be reviewed, 
while the realpolitik of the situation, that ‘outside’ agencies hold money, power 
and influence remains to be faced. In 2007 spokespeople for the European 
Commission, on Fiji, while stressing that humanitarian assistance was exempt 
and that all avenues to agreement would be attempted, spelt out conditions for 
agreement forthrightly.  In one instance: ‘If the responses are not satisfactory 
of course we will have to take measures to totally or partially suspend our 
aid’ (Amadeu Altafaj, EUAustralia 4 March 2007). In another: ‘We don’t like 
coups d’états’ (Pietro Petrucci, EUAustralia 9 December 2006).
Interventions by non-governmental agencies are no less driven by values 
and performance standards, which, not so much ordained from outside, will 
have fervent local supporters or, as in the case with the Cotonou Agreement, 
will be formally embraced on both sides. For example: recurrent disputes 
between the anti-corruption body Transparency International and government 
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figures in Papua New Guinea, with in 2003 its local director being brought 
before a Parliamentary Privileges Committee to receive the ire of Members 
aggrieved by an agency report (Duffield, 2006, p. 107). In another example: 
the critical international publicity campaign by Amnesty International docu-
menting continued transgressions against human rights and the rule of law, as 
it monitored the return to democratic processes after the 2000 Fiji coup d’état 
(Amnesty International, 2003).
Government	agencies	and	NGOs
The importance of international agencies in the Pacific region is well recog-
nised, especially in development economics, campaigns for civic develop-
ment and in cultural affairs. The work of government agencies and NGOs 
will be integrated, e.g. those like the Australian government’s AusAID will 
disburse funds for community projects run by private agencies.  The ubiquity 
and collective large scale of these agencies’ operations is significant, along 
with their policy impacts, as in the strong example above of the EU enforcing 
its Cotonou standards; and there is the third important aspect of the global 
connectedness of these organisations. Through multilateral agencies of many 
kinds, for good or ill, small populations generally with weak economies, dis-
persed over vast areas, are brought into a world system of power relations, 
business, economic management and cultural interfaces.
Questions arise: How do these organisations operate? What kinds of value 
formation and policy making will inform what they decide to do?  Further, 
there is the strategically important aspect of mass media and communication 
management. State agencies and NGOs engage in mass communication across 
distances because they operate in many dispersed places, and because they 
must deliver messages to many publics, viz political constituencies in donor 
countries, cooperating or competing agencies, and participants and recipients in 
the partner countries. Hopefully the study provided here of the very particular 
case of the International Crisis Group as an agency concerned with operating 
levers of power, will be a useful contribution to understanding of these core 
aspects of the movement, specifically with the NGOs.
The movement itself is populated by a large range of diverse often 
wholly unconnected organisations; some are governmental or wholly govern-
ment-sponsored, some formed by religious or benevolent institutions, others 
founded by small groups, many international but many also locally-based. 
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As an example of the diversity and also connectedness of operations, the Re-
gional Secretariat of the SSPI (Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific 
International) lists donors including the European Commission and NZAid, 
and ‘metropolitan’ affiliates, e.g. organisations in Australia and the United 
States, along with several regional affiliates; and advertises four local NGOs 
interested respectively in social, economic and political issues in Fiji; civil 
society development in Fiji; a body that provides theatre performances linked 
to development in Vanuatu, and a pan-Pacific women’s organisation (FSPI).
The inventory provided by the leading Directory of Development Or-
ganisations, from NonProfitExpert.com, concentrates mostly on the economic 
development sector and includes banks and other financial institutions, embas-
sies, unions or business organisations, certain national government depart-
ments, and churches, along with local community organisations and the classic 
international aid or rights agencies like Caritas or Transparency International. 
The locally based formations will have links to ‘metropolitan’ organisations 
or governments, especially as funds providers. Together this cosmopolitan 
collection of agencies makes a concerted effort and generates major impact. 
Among the larger concentrations there are 120 such offices listed for Papua 
New Guinea, 12 being major overseas-based agencies; there are 91 listed for 
Fiji, 76 in Vanuatu,  Samoa 55,  New Caledonia 46 , Solomon Islands 46, 
and 42 in Tonga.
NGOs:	The	International	Crisis	Group
The purpose here is to provide a detailed study of the functions of Crisis 
Group as a leading international conflict resolution organisation, which has 
achieved prominence through its sophisticated mode of operation and dem-
onstrated influence in circles of power, and to examine the extent to which 
it exploits and depends on mass media. By extension this will permit us to 
draw conclusions more generally about internationalist action in response to 
local or regional crises, and also to understand better the place of mass media 
in advocacy and in influencing conflict resolution. The intention of the au-
thor is to demonstrate how the organisation functions and show the level of 
importance of its media operation; noting outcomes from its work (including 
outcomes of media initiatives, and also media phenomena as outcomes of 
initiatives generally). 
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Methodology
The method of research has been to examine a key sampling of documents 
routinely kept by the organisation as an instructive record of its operations. 
As it is concerned with advocacy, where measurement of achievements can 
be elusive, an ongoing journal is helpful to show outsiders the scope and char-
acter of operations. A self-critical, non-confidential (if unpublished) record 
also will give assurance of transparency such as the organisation promotes 
in public life generally, and help its own officers to make improvements. 
The documents in question are: Annual reports of Crisis Group in recent 
years, 2004-2006 inclusive, offering a middle-term account of its concerns 
and activities; monthly Advocacy Reports circulated within the organisation, 
for the three months October to December 2006, inclusive; and the monthly 
playbook or compilation of media ‘cuttings’ kept by Crisis Group, for the 
same three months’ period. The full set of reports and briefings for 2007 to 
date was also reviewed.
The last quarter of 2006 was chosen as the most recent and complete 
compilation available when the study was commenced in January 2007. Crisis 
erupts or develops in any month; events and processes will follow unpre-
dictable courses; the author considers no specific period can be regarded as 
typical or untypical for the incidence of activity. However the archive of Crisis 
Group public documents—reports, regular regional briefings, speeches, articles 
commissioned for leading newspapers—has been checked also to identify the 
most recently occurring issues, in the Asia Pacific region, from the beginning 
of  2007.  Principles and operational concepts driving the work of the Crisis 
Group and inherent in its activities are investigated. These are clearly implicit 
in documentation from the organisation, most notably the annual reports and 
the speeches or writings of its executive members.
Crisis Group: Rationale, structure and functions
Crisis Group was formed in 1995 as an independent, non-profit, non-gov-
ernmental organisation, with now more than 130 staff members on five 
continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy 
aiming to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. It grounds its approach in 
field research, engaging political analysts located within or close by coun-
tries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. It 
produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations, which 
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are targeted at key international decision-makers. Therefore, as Crisis Group 
declares, it ‘works closely with governments and those who influence them, 
including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support 
for its policy prescriptions’. 
The essential facts on organisational structures and practice are clear 
from its own sources, the information above obtained from the web document 
‘International Crisis Group: working to prevent conflict worldwide’ (ICG, 
Home).  Crisis group has its headquarters in Brussels and advocacy offices in 
Washington, New York, London and Moscow. It currently operates 17 field 
offices with analysts working in more than 60 crisis-affected countries and 
territories.1 It has an annual budget of about US$14 million, gathered from a 
long list of governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual 
donors	(ICG, Home).
It is above all an advocacy organisation grounded in field research. 
Analysing information collected in the conflict regions, it transmits recom-
mendations to people able to take political decisions necessary to prevent or 
end the violent conflict in question. Promoting particular courses of politi-
cal action on such matters, Crisis Group has had to address questions of the 
rightfulness and legitimacy of international intervention, which as a last resort 
can also include military action; and as essentially a hard-headed, pragmatic 
operation, it avers that it looks beyond ideology seeking to find solutions that 
will simply work.  
Face-to-face meetings with decision-makers are a core component of its 
advocacy work; talking with the ‘people who matter’ and giving them informa-
tion from the ground that they need along with a comprehensive analysis of 
the problem; promoting informed decisions. The organisation then magnifies 
the transmission of its messages through extensive yet targeted work with 
the media. To be seen and noted in prominent media outlets in itself adds to 
the organisation’s recognition and	status, and therefore influence, but that is 
treated as a secondary goal of its communication strategy. The prime focus 
of Crisis Group’s media work is essentially to reach in public those same 
decision-makers it meets regularly in private. Thus, unlike many NGOs, 
which have a media-centred approach to their work and aim for mass media 
impact to inflate general public awareness, hoping this will pressure elected 
officials to make the right decisions; the International Crisis Group aims to 
address those at the levers of power directly, both in closed-door meetings 
and through elite media. 
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At the highest level, this extends to drawing on the organisation’s president 
and Board of Trustees—generally former ministers, including two former heads 
of state—to take part in making approaches and presentations to top govern-
ment decision-makers. Along with the president and chief executive, Gareth 
Evans, previously Australian Foreign Minister 1988-96;	the	board’s co-chairs 
and leading advocates are the former European Commissioner for External 
Relations Christopher Patten and former US Ambassador Thomas Pickering. 
The organisation proudly uses testimonials from distinguished international 
figures. In particular Kofi Annan as UN Secretary General, provided a comment 
useful for the present review, showing awareness of the motivation, mode of 
operation and high practical value of the group’s work:     
You have made the International Crisis Group a global voice of con-
science … Your mediation work—and your leadership in early warning and 
conflict prevention—have been enormously important. So has your intel-
lectual contribution to finding new approaches to long-standing conflicts. 
Your well researched and carefully argued reports have greatly helped us in 
understanding the origins and complexities of the conflict in which we become 
involved—often at short notice  (Annan, 2002).  
Operations	of	the	ICG	over	three	months
The advocacy reports of the organisation for the last quarter of 2006 
provide a comprehensive picture of Crisis Group’s primary activities in the 
period. They have been dissected to discern the main elements; especially the 
policy recommendations the organisation’s representatives are promoting; the 
distribution of its efforts worldwide; and the relationship between media 
work and other aspects of the operation. The information was tabulated 
and divided into six categories: the main topics targeted in the month under 
report; subsidiary topics; the activities or initiatives undertaken by Crisis 
Group; specific media initiatives; general outcomes, and media outcomes. 
The three working tables produced for October, November and December 
displayed the data for ease of overview. To illustrate, an extract from one 
table is given as an appendix. 
For definition, ‘media’ refers to activity carrying out the three functions 
mentioned above: work under a communication strategy to craft informa-
tion, either to be taken up by general news media or published directly by 
Crisis Group, to help explain the substance of its policy recommendations; 
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secondly,  promotional work, to draw attention to activities of the organisation, 
e.g. mounting a publicity campaign in support of  advocacy activity where 
public awareness may be a useful complement to that work; and thirdly, given 
relatively less importance by this organisation, more reactive management of 
media, e.g. handling casual inquiries from journalists. ‘Outcomes’ are events, 
developments or even declarations by power-holders which can be linked to 
advocacy by Crisis Group, e.g. formulation of a UN Security Council (SC) 
resolution containing principles put to members of the SC by Crisis Group, 
where after the event diplomats in the case agreed the group’s advocacy 
activity was influential in that case. These outcomes will usually be claimed 
as such in monthly reports.
Distinctions between activities and outcomes can be somewhat blurred. 
For example, for a political advocacy group to obtain direct private access to 
heads of major governments or governmental agencies like the EU or UN, 
is an achievement in itself, but would not count as an outcome unless that 
act was seen to deliver influence. The following sections draw on monthly 
Advocacy Reports.
Operations	in	October	2006
The month’s activities were led by a coordinated lobbying and publicity 
campaign on Crisis Group’s Middle East Initiative. It began with a state-
ment supporting a comprehensive settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict, signed 
by 135 ‘respected global leaders’—primarily former presidents, prime min-
isters and foreign ministers—using paid space in the Financial Times, and 
The New York Times, and freely offered space in Le Monde and Ashraq al 
Awsat (4 October 2006), and near simultaneous publication of an advocacy 
report, To Reach a Lasting Peace (5 March 2007), filling the details of a 
peace initiative. This was a characteristic operation, both texts opening with 
declarative style, assertive comment and an overall tone of assurance. It was 
forthright with advice, founded as it was on solid research and a comprehen-
sive analysis of seemingly intractable problem. Crisis Group does not shy 
away from criticizing positions taken by any party, in this case determin-
ing which parties ought to take the lead in new Middle East peace initia-
tive: ‘American and Israeli reluctance to move, coupled with extreme fragil-
ity of the situation, means that others—the UN, EU and Arab world—must 
now step forward with fresh ideas and initiatives, optimally to persuade 
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Washington to act …’ The report proposed content for the UN Security 
Council Resolution. As outcomes; it was seen as significant success that ‘To 
reach a lasting peace’ was Crisis Group’s most downloaded report for the 
month—25,611 copies were accessed.
A report on Darfur, Getting the UN Into Darfur, was published on 12 
October 2006, as the platform for direct lobbying of the UN Security Council, 
and a UN Undersecretary General, on themes that took in ‘acceptance of a 
firm stand vis-a-vis Khartoum … including economic measures, petroleum 
sanctions, a no-fly zone, disinvestment, and planning for possible military 
engagement’. There were meetings with like-minded NGOs, notably in 
London, in the context of an ongoing public campaign of activities, and a meet-
ing with ‘high level Administration contacts in the US’. Once again there was 
a precipitating factor, a ‘deteriorating situation’ in Darfur. It was remarked that 
the US Congress and Senate had asked the Arab League to exert pressure to 
stop a Sudanese military offensive, placed in the ‘outcomes’ column on trust 
that Crisis Group lobbying had contributed to the legislators’ thinking.
Another public document, a briefing paper on the elections in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2 October 2006), aimed to ensure 
a positive follow-up to the first round of voting. Crisis Group called for 
an extension of the EU military force’s mandate and wrote on this to the 
German Chancellor representing the European Council presidency. 
Contact was made with intelligence officials and experts on African affairs in 
Washington. A commentary article signed by co-chair Chris Patten and pub-
lished in Suddeutsche Zeitung at the end of September actually led the charge 
and helped achieve a major breakthrough after sparking a serious debate in 
German media. Consequently the Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung in 
October publicly left open the option of prolonged EU troop presence in 
some form.
Advocacy in October on Cote	d’Ivoire was timed to co-ordinate with 
a UN Security Council debate and urged ‘rapid and united Council action’. 
Crisis Group worked through the Japanese Ambassador Takahiro Shinyo as 
UN envoy and noted —	as outcomes —	that its points had been delivered to 
the Cote d’Ivoire government. The policy recommendations also matched the 
content of the Security Council resolution passed on 1 November 2006.
A report was published on Colombia coinciding with a forthcoming trip 
there by the US Undersecretary of State Nick Burns, whom the Crisis Group 
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was able to brief beforehand. As outcomes, Burns raised Crisis Group recom-
mendations and the visit was subject to widespread media reportage. To keep 
Afghanistan	and	Pakistan ‘on the international community’s radar’, high 
level meetings and briefings were reported in Paris, Copenhagen and Brussels, 
with NATO, the EU, MEPs and national MPs, and national ministers. The 
South Asia Programme Director briefed European press.
The insistence on ‘high level’ connections is evident in other activities 
from that month. The NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 
and EU High Representative Javier Solana, met the Trustees on a ‘range of 
issues’. Evans met UN Ambassadors on the Congo elections, Darfur, the 
South Caucasus, the Arab-Israeli conflict, ‘the need for rather stiff sanctions 
against Uzbekistan’, and ‘dangers of delay on Kosovo’. Ambassadors from 
five countries attended a New York reception held for prospective members 
of Crisis Group’s Advisory Council. Crisis Group also participated in a round 
of events in the United States on its theme of Women in Peacebuilding, 
involving prominent activists.
Operations	in	November	2006
With its declared topic ‘countering the insurgency in Afghanistan’, in 
advance of a UN Security Council mission to Afghanistan in mid-Novem-
ber, Crisis Group provided field-based input, which it considered to have 
helped shape the terms of reference for the visit. Among outcomes, its report, 
Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, was downloaded 
26,000 times from its website and generated ‘extensive positive feedback 
from the policy community’. The report was made obligatory reading within 
NATO, and in Kabul, Crisis Group’s senior analyst discussed it directly with 
the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.
Because of the ‘deteriorating situation in Somalia’, Crisis Group issued 
on 27 November 2006 a conflict risk alert warning, in which it attacked a draft 
resolution on Somalia the US was intending to present to the UN Security 
Council, to authorize the lifting of the UN arms embargo. It said the resolution 
would aid one side and could trigger all-out war. ‘The Council should apply 
maximum pressure on both sides to resume negotiations,’ it said.
As part of this Somalia initiative the Washington and Brussels 
offices worked through news media, calling on contacts and giving broadcast 
interviews. The exposure was accompanied by discussions with US 
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Administration officials and all Security Council members. An op-ed was 
placed in the Boston Globe, circulated by the EU to all Ambassadors. On 
outcomes, the warning was ‘picked up widely and appears to have been 
influential in a 28 November retreat by the State Department’, which enabled 
the UN resolution to be delayed.
Again provoked by a deteriorating situation, in Darfur, the International 
Crisis group ‘continued to push its message that sustained pressure was 
required to change calculations of the Khartoum regime’. One outcome was 
not happily received: senior officers met a key US official in Sudan, who 
expressed ‘his desire to pursue multilateral dialogue with Khartoum before 
considering more coercive measures’. Efforts on Darfur would be heavily 
intensified in the following month.
For the Democratic Republic of Congo advocacy centred on ‘effective 
peace-building measures, addressing integration of the armed forces with 
demobilisation of opposition militia, strengthening of Parliament, and con-
tinued presence of a strong UN force (MONUC)’. Relevant officials were 
contacted through the Brussels roundtable, and advocacy calls at the United 
Nations. On Kosovo’s final status, there was joint hosting with the Belgian UN 
Mission of a Kosovo roundtable 13 November 2006, employing expert advice, 
viz former Special Representative of Secretary-General, Soren Jessen Petersen, 
and also publication of a new report, Kosovo Status: Delay is Risky.
Crisis Group had published nine of its own articles/op-eds in the 
reporting period, on Uzbekistan, Somalia, the Middle East (Syria), the 
International Criminal Court, and children in war: in Liberation, The CS 
Monitor, Guardian, Al Hayat, FT Deutschland and Transitions Online. Visits 
to the website hit a new high of 487,785 in November, while it had 9 million 
hits and 3.5 million page views. The list of email contacts increased by 10,000 
to 90,000 in total.
Operations	in	December	2006
Calls for ‘stronger pressure on Sudan’. Crisis Group advocacy, responding to 
‘lack of political progress’, ‘stepped up a gear’, proposing increased pressure 
on Sudan to accept a proposed hybrid African Union/UN peace-keeping force 
in Darfur. Its campaign had the Crisis Group president and other senior figures 
employing access to key leaders, and added mass media activity as reinforce-
ment. Advocacy meetings were obtained with the heads of the British and 
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German governments and the incoming UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, 
(‘highlighting the need to move tough economic, financial and personalised 
sanctions, including on individuals in the regime, if no acceptance of an 
AU/UN force emerged by the end of December’). Other senior US officials 
were contacted, including US senators preparing a resolution passed on 9 
December 2006 urging implementation of the agreement for a peacekeeping 
force under UN command.
Parallel media action was organised Gareth Evans and Ken Roth, 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, held a press conference on 
13 December 2006 in Brussels, issuing a statement calling on the EU to 
support tough new action against Sudanese leaders. For outcomes during the 
month: Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of a possible no-fly zone 
over Darfur, and Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that among many 
security tasks Germany would do ‘what it had to’ in the EU and G8 presiden-
cies. Crisis Group campaigned to ‘highlight the Pakistan government’s failed 
policy regarding Taliban-linked militants in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas’. A report, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants (11 
December 2006) initiated intensive debate in Islamabad, widely reported 
in national and international media. Crisis Group raised the report with 
American legislators, the State Department and USAID, and UN agencies. 
It was quoted by BBC, CNN, International Herald Tribune, The New York 
Times, Boston Globe, The Guardian and Washington Post, and by regional 
press including Dawn, The News, Daily Times, The Hindu and The nation. It 
became Crisis Group’s third most downloaded report for the year (31,669). 
This kind of success in obtaining exposure for an argument was seen to have 
had a material outcome: ‘It determined denials by government officials on 
increased cross-border incursions since signing of the September agreement 
with pro-Taliban militants’.
On Iraq	 ‘proactive Crisis Group advocacy’ continued following the 
long-awaited U.S. Baker-Hamilton Report, proposing a multinational effort. 
The Crisis Group, After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq (19 December 
2006) generated substantial media attention ahead of President George Bush’s 
promised new strategy announcement in January. The report argued that Baker-
Hamilton did not go far enough in its prescriptions and called for a ‘clean 
break in the way the US and other international actors deal with the Iraqi 
government, and the way the US deals with the region’. If extensive coverage 
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in mainstream media is an outcome in its own right this was persuasive effort; 
the document was outlined in numerous wire reports and newspaper articles 
including The Daily Star, The Independent and Washington Post—together 
with placement of a supportive op-ed article in the Financial Times.
On Somalia, prior to the Ethiopian military offensive, Crisis Group tar-
geted UN Security Council members, objecting to the US draft SC resolution 
that would have permitted Ethiopia to participate in a regional intervention 
force. UN officials concurred, and the SC later unanimously adopted an 
amended resolution, authorising deployment of the proposed IGASOM peace-
keeping force—but excluding frontline states from it (one being Ethiopia). 
Several UN delegations attributed this in large part to Crisis Group’s efforts. 
However events quickly developed to overtake the Crisis Group efforts, as the 
TFG (provisional government) and Ethiopian army evicted the CSIC (Islamic 
Courts) from major towns. ‘Massive casualties and internal displacement have 
been reported and a scramble ensued in Mogadishu as rival militias and faction 
leaders returned to their fiefdoms,’ Crisis Group reported.
On outcomes in mass communication including media: Crisis Group 
published nine articles/op-ed on Somalia, the Middle East (Iran-Syria talks), 
Aceh province in Indonesia, Congo, Oriente Proximo, Nagorno Karabakh, 
Bolivia and Columbia; in Al Hayat, Jakarta Post, Boston Globe, El Mondo, 
Financial Times, openDemocracy.net, La Razon, The Nation (Kenya) and Le 
Temps. Visits to the website hit a new record at 495,467. The list of email 
contacts totaled nearly 92,000. The organisation was able to congratulate itself 
on ‘another year of impressive growth’ in its digital communication efforts. In 
total there were 4.85 million visits to the website in 2006, 1.5 million higher 
than 2005 and 3million higher than 2004. Total reports downloaded over the 
year increased to 3.1 million from 2.3 million in 2005.
Operations of Crisis Group in Asia-Pacific 2007
Crisis Group maintains a ‘crisis watch’ on 79 countries or territories, issuing 
monthly ‘alerts’ in cases of conflict where its analysts judge that international 
intervention would be warranted. Its watch list, as can be seen from the above, 
indicates its current preoccupations are with ongoing major distress in Darfur 
and Western Africa, Kosovo, former Soviet republics in Central Asia, and the 
Middle East. Yet its interests are comprehensive and far reaching and as well 
the list currently includes Fiji,	Timor-Leste (East Timor) and Tonga	(since 
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rioting in November 2006), Indonesia,	 the	 Philippines	 and	Taiwan	
Strait. Apart from Indonesia and Timor-Leste troubled regions of the Asia- 
Pacific have not received the full treatment of intensified Crisis Group re-
search, high level lobbying, placement of signal articles with elite media 
outlets, and active campaigns generating attention in general mass media; 
but watching briefs that are now kept put target areas on the agenda for in-
tensified work wherever and whenever it might be seen as warranted. Each 
monthly Crisis Watch bulletin identifies priority cases, noting whether their 
situation has deteriorated or improved. In June 2007 Fiji, following the 2006 
coup, remained in this special watch category, classed as ‘unchanged’ (ICG, 
1 June 07). The country’s first notification since its most recent coup d’etat 
had been made in January (ICG, 2 January 2007), in the category of ‘potential 
or actual crisis situations’. Since January 2007 Crisis Group’s monthly Asia 
Briefing has analysed local issues in the conflict in Indonesia	Papua (ICG, 
19 July 2007), and other issues within Indonesia: local power struggles in 
Maluku (ICG, 22 May 2007); current status with the insurrectionist group 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (ICG, 3May 2007, 24 January 2007), and stabilization 
in Aceh (ICG, 22 March 2007). Other interventions on Indonesia included 
published articles by Crisis Group’s long-standing analyst on that country, 
Sidney Jones, on future prospects (3 January 2007) and the capture of the JI 
leader Abu Dujama (7June 2007). The parliamentary elections in Timor Leste 
produced a notice in the June Asia Bulletin (ICG, 12 June 2007), stating ‘no 
one is offering concrete solutions to the country’s many problems’. Timor 
Leste had been put under Crisis Watch in the lead-up to the voting, in the 
March bulletin (ICG, 1 March 2007).
Main	characteristics	of	Crisis	Group	
Crisis Group is an advocacy group seeking policy changes, though not for 
direct material benefits to itself--unlike for instance an industrial lobby 
interested in tariff changes or getting access to natural resources. It works in 
public diplomacy, and transparency is a hallmark of its work. Its positions 
and goals are publicly stated, and they are defended by intellectual argument 
rather than coercive pressure, though where such pressure is attempted, e.g. 
by adding media efforts, it is not a concealed process. 
The objectives formulated for each advocacy exercise are deliberate, 
focused on securing definite, identified actions from specified governments, 
multinational organisations and other key players, and these objectives 
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are couched in the most forthright terms. The mode of operation is highly 
pragmatic: as shown in the paraphrasing of a three months’ diary, above, tim-
ing is considered for each initiative and a reason given for the initiative at that 
time. Goals can be shortterm; the approach is incrementalist, one reform or 
one successful change on the ground, at each time. The pragmatic approach 
obviously will be compatible with having a strong media side to the enter-
prise; promotional work and public advocacy must be more functional when 
the goals are made clear.     
As with many an exercise in public diplomacy there is a well organised 
mass media operation.
The unambiguousness of Crisis Group messages helps it to get those 
messages quoted in news media, which may enjoy ferreting out hidden truths 
but overwhelmingly lack patience for complicated, coy, ambiguous points of 
view. The media effort is measured; resources are applied to specific projects 
and addressed principally to elite news outlets known to be used by members 
of the political establishment. 
More than its media connections, the Crisis Group demonstrates privi-
leged lines of communication to the upper echelons of leading institutions. 
It is well connected to the United Nations Organisation, the European Union 
and NATO, and to leading elements within the United States government and 
political community. These organisations are chosen largely because they can 
deliver outcomes; they are powerful in the world. Likewise other institutions 
anywhere will be approached where engaged in a running issue. The relation-
ships are cultivated both in conventional ways, and through special services 
that the organisation can offer in its public affairs function, as the provider of 
well-researched arguments. It serves as a free, good quality, policy consultancy 
for persons at the level of, for instance, a senior UN executive. A report or 
briefing paper is usually published with each new initiative, and Crisis Group 
is known for the strong intellectual quality of its inputs. 
The organisation has also availed itself of another very powerful resource 
through engaging with senior personnel who have ended their main life 
careers. It gathers former leaders willing to share their advanced knowledge, 
contact books, judgment and expertise. Bearing in mind that the objective is 
a humanistic good, to avert violent conflict across the globe, it has a strongly 
altruistic aspect. 
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Ethos	and	doctrine
What are the terms of reference which provide motivation for the 
International Crisis Group? What is its guiding philosophy? Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the organisation has no institutional ideology, as it makes clear from 
its own statements, e.g. the annual reports.	The organisation exists to prevent 
and resolve deadly conflict simply for the purpose of reducing human suf-
fering, and its approach to and recommendations for each specific conflict 
are tailored to fit the needs of that particular situation. This naturally leads 
to contradictions between the organisation’s approach to conflict X and its 
approach to conflict Y, but, the reasoning goes, if X and Y are unique conflicts 
with local causes and consequences, then why should anyone expect their 
solutions to be the same? In this reasoning, it says solutions to complicated 
political problems cannot be shoe-horned into any one-size-fits-all model. 
Despite this—or, really perhaps because of this—the organisation believes it 
commands strong loyalty and is highly regarded around the world and across 
the political spectrum.  
That all said, the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), in 
international law, does provide a recurring background theme to some of 
the more high-profile advocacy the group is involved in, such as its work 
on Darfur. The report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (2001) provides a comprehensive guide to the issues and 
evolution of debate. It proposes that state sovereignty implies responsibilities, 
which can be abrogated if the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt 
mass violence due to internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure. In 
short, the international community, acting though the UN Security Council, 
has the responsibility to protect civilians facing mass atrocities if their own 
state cannot or will not do so.
Whereas Crisis Group is not ideologically-driven, where principles are 
debated, as in public presentations by Evans as president (Evans 2006, 2006A), 
arguments will be drawn from history and jurisprudence. For example discus-
sions on R2P emphasise legal authority described in terms of  Security Council 
responsibilities under Article 24 of the UN Charter, or authority drawn from 
obligations under human rights declarations, covenants and treaties. Debate 
on the responsibility of governments considers the historical fact of many 
non-state organisations increasingly taking part in humanitarian intervention, 
sometimes against claims of state sovereignty under UN Charter (Article 2.1). 
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Other organisations share Crisis Group assumptions and sympathies. The 
United Nations itself has applied the R2P principle to its objective of free-
dom from fear, in the light of today’s focused worldwide interest in develop-
ment, security and human rights (see Secretary General’s report, 2005). The 
European Union has followed a similar line. Citing a need for legal bases for       
its human rights and democratisation activities, it adopted two Regulations, 
975/1999 and 975/1999, on democracy and rule of law, and on fundamental 
freedoms (EC External Relations, 2007). 
Communication	management	and	mass	media
By making recommendations for particular policies, Crisis Group clearly 
cannot fall into the non-committal branch of public debate that admits all 
possibilities and views for an even-handed hearing. No fence-sitting al-
lowed. Nevertheless its media output is a journalism of truth, as there is a 
certain probity required where Crisis Group publishes on its own account, 
most distinctly with the regular monthly output of ten articles contributed to 
leading journals. It is also journalism well inside the mainstream of estab-
lishment thinking, if at times sailing close to the horizon of what is ‘politi-
cally acceptable’ in elite circles. As the titles of the newspapers indicate, e.g. 
Financial Times, Le Monde, Washington Post, Asharq Al Awsat, the group 
seeks influence with readers who have power to effect change. Therefore it 
needs to itself make the grade in terms of meeting the prevailing journalis-
tic standards of fact-finding, new ideas and important disclosures, to get its 
message always into at least one serious political journal of record in capital 
cities where it is operating.
This approach is common enough for advocacy groups or institutions able 
to generate a large volume of new, researched information. The Spokesperson’s 
service of the European Commission though making an effort to be open to 
all, typically concentrates on main quality outlets, as indicated in the selection 
of titles that appear in its daily playbook of media cuttings--similar to those 
of Crisis Group (DG Communication EC, 2006). The bigger newspapers with 
the most interest in all aspects of EC activity will employ larger and more 
specialised bureau staffs in Brussels. In a widely acknowledged  ‘two-step’ 
communication flow,  messages are got  through to a corps of best-informed 
readers via such ‘first-line’ media, and then the news may be lifted or quoted, 
or followed-up by others (See AIM Research Consortium, 2007, pp. 157-8).
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The second part of the Crisis Group operation broadens the approach, as 
it generally runs one or two main campaigns each month, where the media 
operation will gear up into a greater level of activity than for the average 
report release. Targeted media contacts, media releases and news conferences 
are used to promote the researched field report—with recommendations for 
action at the centre of the campaign. 
As Crisis Group said in its 2006 annual report, ‘we have tried to avoid 
“talking head” instant commentary not directly related to our own reports’. 
While staff appeared frequently in broadcast interviews, it is not set up as a 
publicity machine offering comments on any topic. Of more interest to the 
organisation, direct input into the ‘quality’ media sector was strong: 5,535 
mentions in major media around the world in 2006 (as compared to 4,501 for 
the whole of 2005, 3,166 in 2004 and 2,503 in 2003). These numbers do not 
include republished articles and reprinted wire copy: counting such repub-
lications, the number of mentions in 2006 jumps to 18,066 (compared with 
10,677 in 2005 and 5,419 in 2004). In addition, Crisis Group Board members 
and staff published 142 comment (op-ed) pieces in 2006 (compared with 129 
in 2005, 105 in 2004 and 63 in 2003) (Annual Report, 2006).
The organisation’s own monitor of news media directly initiated from its 
in-house sources tracks mentions of its work. This monitor showed as might 
be expected that news items generated by the office were being picked up by 
the targeted media outlets, but also by a broader range including international 
radio services (BBC, RFI, DW, VOA in particular), and newspapers in all 
regions where issues were being contested. The main national newsagencies 
(including Reuters, DPA, AFP, UPI, Bloomberg) were heavily represented in 
the monitor, with a multiplier effect for those reports. Reports were consulted 
for October, November and December 2006, in each case telling the topic or 
brief content of each news story, its source, applicable world region, and the 
agency or media outlet handing it. As a diligent though understandably not 
exhaustive monitor of the world news media it demonstrates high exposure 
for the organisation. 
The quoted sources are mostly listed as ‘Crisis Group’ itself, presumably 
taken from central media releases, with also 10-20 other personnel of the 
organisation quoted in each of the monthly monitors. It gives an impression 
of many co-ordinated voices operating across a broad range. All of the geo-
graphical regions of activity were well represented except for Europe and 
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North America, where violent conflict was at lost in abeyance. The synopsis 
in Table 1 indicates the main issues in play during one month. On content of 
coverage, it identifies two main sets of reports, being those obviously gener-
ated directly from Crisis Group releases, and news agency copy.
Additional to this work with mass media, Crisis Group puts emphasis 
on ‘getting the message out’ directly to an expanding mailing list of 4200 
‘senior policy makers and those who influence them’ (in 2005); by email with 
attachment of reports and papers, to over 17,000 ‘Influentials’,	and to 80,000 
web subscribers. Added to large numbers of page visits to the central website 
and downloads of reports, the Crisis Group is clearly keeping pace with the 
breaking-up or pluralising trend in media use associated with accelerated use 
of the internet.    
Conclusion
Crisis Group stands apart from many other non-government organisations 
through its commitment strictly to research and lobbying at centres of power. 
Its analysts will do field work in dangerous settings to gather reliable infor-
mation, but it is not a relief organisation and so does not operate prominently 
in the field. Similarly it has no profile to maintain in mass media, on the 
Month
Total 
reports
Crisis 
Group 
originated
Agency 
reports
Topics most 
mentioned
October 
2006
529 131 123
North Korea, Darfur, 
less of Thailand and 
Mid-east
November 
2006
352 143 93
Pakistan-Afghanistan, 
N.Korea,Israel-Iraq-
Lebanon, Kirghkistan, 
Zimbabwe, 
Afghanistan
December 
2006
536 197 137
Middle East incl. 
Fatah-Hamas, Central 
Asia, Aceh poll, 
Pakistan-Afghanistan, 
Horn of Africa-Darfur
Table 1: Summary of International Crisis Group media usage reports
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ground, no call to demonstrate its work by publicising actions of its officers 
in war zones or refugee areas, whereas in the case of many organisations, 
e.g. ICRC, the media witness may be highly important for their protection 
and in garnering international public support. A further key aspect of Crisis 
Group, for the present discussion, is that in its work against violent conflict 
it sets out to function as part of a broad international scheme. Conflicts in 
remote parts of Africa or Central Asia, or for that matter on isolated Pacific 
islands, are scrutinised and brought to notice in world forums. The practi-
cability of such work builds on the fact of global integration; no region is 
itself an ‘island’, autonomous of movements in the wider world, ever able to 
escape its afflictions and interventions. Non-Government Organisations like 
Crisis group with their links to governments and other sources of influence 
participate in management of global business—including the business of the 
smallest countries.
The International Crisis Group in one sense is a model, where it has 
achieved startling success in terms of its ability to demonstrate direct influ-
ence on the management and outcomes of crisis situations. It has participated 
in the development of a community of non-government agencies active in the 
conflict resolution field, and in formulating statements of guiding principles 
for such organisations. In the process it has contributed to a change in prac-
tices, especially in altering the prerogatives and behaviour of government 
agencies. Where crisis situations are sometimes said to be fields of danger 
and opportunity, this organisation has made its plans to alleviate danger and 
suffering, and generate opportunities for positive change.
Media are key to its approach, and again it provides a model for certain 
purposes, where it concentrates on engaging elite media rather than higher-
volume mass media. Because of the fixed approach in its core activity, in 
dealing directly and predominantly with senior figures in institutions, its media 
plan, a ‘two step’ approach concentrating on use of restricted ‘upper echelon’ 
outlets, has easily fallen into place. With its transparent and well researched 
‘pitches’ to media it plainly obtains a friendly and accommodating response 
with good levels of usage. Furthermore it has come to use its media service 
also as an integral part of the research and communication process, through 
the mounting of recurrent campaigns around issues of the month. In addition 
it now relies strongly on distribution of its information in millions of pack-
ages, via digital media. Media representation, and ‘successes’ with heavy 
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coverage of its leading initiatives are treated as valued outcomes of activity. 
Crisis Group like many other organisations has taken on board that commu-
nication, in diverse forms, is playing an ever larger and more central role in 
all social, economic and political activity in this century.
Note
1. Intervention sites: In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic          
of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
the Sahel region, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, 
Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey; in the 
Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti and Venezuela.
Currency	conversions: dcerates.com (2 September 2007) 
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2007 Jeanz journalism education conference
Jeanz (Journalism Education Association of NZ Inc.) is the professional 
body of journalism educators in New Zealand. Its aims include promoting 
the highest professional standards in the teaching of journalism, collecting 
and disseminating information about journalism education, and fostering 
research into journalism and journalism education.
Massey University’s Journalism School 
Wellington, December 10-11, 2007 
“The future for the mainstream: The changing demands on journalists 
and the challenge for journalism educators.”
For more details on the conference, please go to www.jeanz.org.nz
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